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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATHOF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

j

Priority No. 2

\7

V.

BRET THOMAS CRIDDLE,

Case No. 950639-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL BASIS AND NATURE OF APPEAL
Defendant appeals his conviction for theft, a second-degree feloi
grounds that tin1 dial |udj.u.' was lioslik1 and hiusnl against linn -iml that he v\ as
uiciMnjv'!^'!' "> '.i* si*' !"^ < ouiisf! H< •r;** i se defendant was convicted of a seconddegree felony, this Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(Supp. 1995).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was the relationship between the defendant and the trial judge so

strained that either the court, trial counsel, or the State should have moved to
disqualify the judge undea
t

^tually "reviewing" the

decision, but evaluating the circumstances of the case to determine whether the

trial court was actually biased. State v. Neeley. 748 P.2d 1091, 1094-95 (Utah
1988). In Neeley. the Court ruled that "absent a showing of actual bias or an
abuse of discretion, failure to [recuse] does not constitute reversible error as long
as the requirements of section 77-35-29 [now rule 29, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure] are met." LL Because defendant did not proceed under rule 29, he
must establish actual bias and plain error.1 Defendant also fashions his claim in
terms of ineffective assistance of counsel.2 Whether trial counsel's performance
fell within constitutional boundaries is a question of law, which this Court
reviews for correctness. State v. Saunders. 893 P.2d 584, 591 (Utah App.
1995). When evaluating an ineffectiveness challenge, this Court reviews the trial
counsel's performance in a "highly deferentiar manner to avoid "secondguessing ... on the basis of an inanimate record." LL.
2.

Were there indications of defendant's incompetency before or during

the trial such that, in order to provide defendant a proper trial or sentencing

1

Since no one requested the trial court to act on a disqualification motion, the
"abuse of discretion" standard does not apply because there was nothing before the court that
required an exercise of discretion.
2

Two attorneys represented defendant: Robert Steele, Legal Defenders'
Association, handled the pre-trial, trial, and immediate post-trial work; Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
represented defendant during the September 1, 1995 sentencing hearing. Given the breadth of
defendant's challenges, it appears he claims both counsel were ineffective as well as the trial
court.
2

proceeding, ,t L,UIII|»CI«*IU \ hearing was mandated? Again, defendant did not raise
this at trial; therefore, defendant needs to show via a plain error analysis, or
ineffective assistance analysis, that the trial court should have unilaterally
requested a competency hearing.
The supreme court spelled out the criteria of showing plain error in State
v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied 49. .s 11, ,s M4(l 989) as follows:
The first requirement for a finding of plain error is that the
error be "plain," i.e., from our examination of the record, we must
be able to say that it should have been obvious to a trial court that it
was committing error. ...The second and somewhat interrelated
requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error affect the
substantial rights of [a party], i.e., that the error be harmful.
Defendant also fashions his claim in terms of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Whether trial counsel's performance fell within constitutional
boundaries is a question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. State
v. Saunders. 893 P.2d 584, 591 (Utah App. 1995). When evaluating an
ineffectiveness challenge, this Couii iev vw* ilic iiial < nunst'ls peitormam e i/« a
"highly deferential" inaiinei l<> avoid

"NPUMKI

^uessini'

. on the basis of an

inanimate nvord " J«.f
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
No provisions need to be reproduced in the text or addenda.
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
On March 20, 1995, defendant went to trial on a charge of theft, a seconddegree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1995) (R. 163-64).
That same day, the jury found him guilty (R. 167). After reviewing the presentence investigation report (PSI) and 90-day diagnostic evaluation at the Utah
State Prison, the court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of one-tofifteen years at the prison and a $5000 fine (R. 203).
Statement of Facts
THE THEFT AND THE GREAT TRAILER CHASE
Stephen Howe had just moved to town from New Jersey, with a trailer full
of construction tools and pieces of equipment parked at his apartment complex in
Murray (R. 300). The trailer itself was only seven months old and worth $1500
to $1800; its contents were worth $15,000 to $18,000 (R. 303).
Late afternoon on April 22, 1994, Mr. Howe returned home from his job
at Ken Garff Ford and noticed immediately that the trailer was missing (R. 304).
Worried that apartment management may have towed it away, he talked to office
personnel, who denied having taken it (i$L). He also talked with neighbors to see

4

if they had noticed anything, but they were unable to help him (R. 307). Finally,
he called the sheriffs department and a deputy took his statement fid.).
Only a few miles to the north at about the same i
Offi.

e
.•

•

northbound on M.un Sired by 45th South (R. 318). According to reports from
other drivers, a Toyota truck was pulling a white trailer, which was swerving and
digging gouges into the pavement (R. 320). As he drove north on main street,
Officer Johnson noticed one deep gouge in the asphalt; following it, he saw the
trailer off the road at approximately 3700 South Main where it had hit a
telephone pole (id.). Officer Johnson pulled off behind the trailer, started
walking toward it, and saw three men,
t J •
t

ading delendai

i W

- * nedback

Y rwn I hough the officer already had told them to stop (R. 322).

Finally, after being hailed once more, the men stopped and placed their hands
against the truck (kL). Now accompanied by back-up, the police took the three
into custody and to the police station (R. 322).
Officer Ben Jones of the Murray police took defendant into custody and to
the police station where he gave him his Miranda rights and questioned him (R.

329). Officer Jones recounted defendant's explanation of how he came to be
involved in the theft.
He indicated to me that he and two of his friends
had been drinking all day long,3 and had talked about
taking the trailer, and they didn't really think they were
going to do it right at that moment, but as they drove by
it, one of the friends said, To hell with it, and they
backed up to the trailer and hooked the trailer to a
vehicle ... all three of them got out. He didn't
physically help them hook it up.
R. 330. Defendant, cooperative in the interview, said that he and his friends
intended to take the trailer to a pawn shop and sell its contents (R. 331).
Defendant's cohorts hooked the trailer to the truck and started driving toward the
Hops and Barley, a bar on 45th South and State street, but because Mr. Howe
had placed a lock on the hitch, it was not completely fastened (id.).
Because they wanted to fasten the hitch completely, as well as discover
what goods they had stolen, defendant and his friends stopped at a Midas Muffler
close to the Hops and Barley and convinced one of the workers to use a
blowtorch to take off the padlock to the door (R. 331). When the door opened,
the powerwasher fell out and defendant and his friends agreed to sell it to
someone at the muffler shop for five dollars. The worker did not cut off the lock
3

Defendant lived at the same apartment complex as Mr. Howe (R. 334). He and
his friends were at his apartment that day (id.).
6

to the hitch, so the trailer was still not completely secured when the three drove
off, going northbound on Main street, dragging Mr. Howe's trailer behind them
(iiL). Only a few blocks north, they noticed that the car was running free and
looked back to find that the trailer had fallen off the truck hitch, swerved off the
road, and hit a telephone pole (R. 332).
THE DEFENDANT AND THE JUDGE
Defendant was out on bail on July 22, 1994 when he missed his pre-trial
conference (R. 25). Judge Brian issued a bench warrant for his arrest that same
day, but the police could not find the defendant until January 20, 1995, when
they arrested him (R. 29). On February 3, 1995, the court held a hearing on the
bench warrant.
THE COURT:

The defendant is before the Court on a bench

warrant. He has been gone someplace for several months.
MR. STEELE [defendant's counsel]: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Where has he been?

MR. STEELE:

Your Honor, Mr. Criddle, my understanding is

that we had a pretrial, and it was back in the time when the calendars
actually finished in the morning. He then made contact with my
office. I wasn't there. And I attempted ~
7

THE DEFENDANT:

I informed the clerk that I was here, and

your clerk told me that she would hand the message to you. She told
me that my date had — my time had been at 10:00, and not 2:00. I
had written 2:00 on my calendar at home. That was the time I
thought I was supposed to be here.
THE COURT:

That was July 22, 1994. Where have you been?

THE COURT:

Where have you been for eight months?

THE DEFENDANT: Living at my apartment and working.
THE COURT:

Let's set a trial date. We will know where to find

you between now and the trial date, for sure.
MR. STEELE:

Your Honor, would you consider setting bail on

this matter?
THE COURT:

Absolutely not. We have had to go get him.

THE DEFENDANT: That's a mistake, your Honor.
R. 239-40. As described later by Adult Probation and Parole Agent, Duane
Malmboy, while the trial court was making its ruling, defendant mimicked
shooting the judge:
[Defendant Bret Criddle turned to the audience and
made hand signals to a middle-aged female, later
identified as the defendant's mother. The hand signals
were made with the defendant's right hand. The index
8

finger was pointing straight with his thumb on top and
the three remaining fingers rolled toward the palm of
the hand. It appeared to simulate a gun shooting. The
defendant then pointed to his head and then to Judge
Brian. It appeared to be a threat that he wanted to shoot
the judge in the head.
R. 32.
By February 7, 1995, defendant had been released due to the overcrowding
consent decree at the county jail (R. 34). When the trial court learned of this, it
issued an order for a no-bail bench warrant because of defendant's conduct
during the hearing (iiL). The police arrested defendant two days later (R. 37).
Later that month, defendant filed a motion requesting his release (R. 38). In the
motion, defendant apologized for his conduct on the February 3 hearing, stated
that he had been interviewed by a "psychologist and psychiatric intake worker at
Valley Mental Health-Salt Lake County Jail Unit and [had no] mental health
problems at this time," and promised to appear for the trial (id.). Defendant
attached a handwritten letter to the motion in which he further apologized (R.
40). The trial court denied the release motion at a Jail Review hearing on March
10 (R. 56).
During the March 10 hearing, the trial court discussed defendant's letter
and the reasons why it had to deny the motion: "He, simply, indicated that he
wanted to get out and establish himself in the community and in the neighborhood
9

and in the work place, and that he was sorry for what had happened, and that he
would not be a problem pending release" (R. 245). The trial court recognized
defendant's sincerity in the apology but stated that, "in its totality, it is not a case
for release pending trial, in the Court's opinion" (R. 246). He even gave counsel
additional opportunity to argue his case for release, but counsel chose not to (R.
245).
After this hearing and again on March 15, defendant wrote the trial court
and again asked for a release pending trial (R. 57-60). The March 15 letter also
set out defendant's version of the facts of the crime and asked for the charges to
be dismissed (R. 60). Neither letter contains any threats (igL). The trial court
never acted on the letters.
On March 20, a jury convicted defendant of theft and he remained in jail
pending sentencing (R. 168). However, on April 18, 1995, he was again
released from jail due to the consent decree (id*.). Though he promptly made an
appointment with AP&P for an interview, he failed to keep it.4 On May 5, the
court re-scheduled sentencing but ordered defendant kept in custody, and that he

4

This information is found in a letter from AP&P to the trial court explaining a
delay in the presentence report. It is contained in the envelope that also has the PSI and the
diagnostic report. This Court on March 15, 1996 made those documents part of the appellate
record.
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not be eligible for release under the consent decree (R. 169). Sometime later,
defendant was taken to the diagnostic unit at the prison for a 90-day evaluation
(R. 172).
It was during the summer while in the diagnostic unit that defendant began
writing his letters to the trial judge. These letters were both direct pleas for
mercy and vague threats of retribution. The first of these letters, dated July 28,
1995, charged the trial judge with "doing the wrong thing over & over again
right in front of me" (R. 174). The tone of the letter is not essentially
threatening, except for the last sentence: "No excuses. No way. You just make
it as right as you can and we can all walk" (isL). The court received another
letter on August 14 (R. 176). Again, defendant told the court it had made a
wrong decision, that it had messed up his life and that "[i]t will hurt that's a
promise and no pleasure will heal you enough."
The next letter, dated August 21, 1995, clarified the meaning of
defendant's claims that the judge would suffer harm: "I'm afraid you've
misunderstood. I in no way intended to threaten you or anyone else. I have faith
that good will come to good and bad will come to bad. I meant to alert and warn
you of a potentially dangerous situation ... .My warning is the same there will be
irrevocable punishment (repercussions)... . I am not, and do not believe, making
11

threat. I simply understand a reasonable, fair, positive, world and in it wrongful
imprisonment will not go unpunished!" (R. 180) (emphasis in original). This
letter was followed by a postscript that stated "I personally don't dislike you.
Outside of this situation, I would not have anything against you at air (R. 181).
On August 11, the court held a sentencing hearing, which was eventually
continued because defendant had not reviewed a copy of the diagnostic evaluation
(R. 375). After rescheduling the hearing, the court discussed the letters with
defendant:
THE COURT: The Court is going to inform you this
morning, Mr. Criddle, that every time you send a letter
threatening my life, I am going to send it back to the
Board of Pardons, and I am going to recommend that
they keep you for the maximum period provided by law.
This is the third letter that you have sent to me
threatening my life. You threatened my life once in
open court.
THE DEFENDANT: No, I didn't, your Honor.
THE COURT: Just a minute. Every letter that you send
to me, I am sending it back in a package to the Board of
Pardons, and I am going to recommend that they keep
you every day that is provided by law. You will be an
old man when you get out of the State Prison. If you
have a certain amount of fun and frolic out of
threatening my life, you just have at it, because every
one of these letters are going to stare you in the face
when you appear before the Board of Pardons.

12

(R. 376). When sentencing finally occurred on September 1, the court explained
the reason for the sentence:
The Court has reviewed the presentence report.
The Court has reviewed the diagnostic evaluation
conducted at the Utah State Prison. The Court has
reviewed the correspondence from the defendant to the
Court. The Court has heard argument from counsel and
heard statements from the defendant. No legal reason
has been established why sentence should not be
imposed.
The Court notes, for the record, that the defendant is
not a clean, one owner, as it relates to the judicial system. In
a very short period of time, as a juvenile, he was before the
juvenile authorities 18 times, one of them for armed robbery.
He had his 18th birthday, and never missed a beat. He was
right back into the system again. He has 18 arrests. ... He has
a protracted record as a juvenile and as a young adult. At 25
years of age, he has been in and out of the system repeatedly.
He has been on probation numerous times. He has had orders
to show cause.
(R. 387).
There were other letters from defendant after sentencing of approximately
the same tone as the earlier ones (R. 216).5 Additionally, on October 12, 1995,
the trial judge sent a letter to the Board of Pardons attaching copies of the letters

5

Although these letters are included in the addendum to the brief, it is not
necessary to discuss them in detail here. Because the trial court received them after
sentencing, they could have no possible affect on defendant's disposition.
13

and asking the Board to let him know when defendant would be released because
"I am somewhat fearful of this man" (R. 217).
THE DECISION TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT TO PRISON
Concerned about defendant's mental stability, both his original trial counsel
and the trial court agreed that he should have a mental evaluation before
sentencing (R. 400-01). That evaluation ultimately was conducted as part of a
90-day diagnostic evaluation at the prison. A psychologist interviewed and tested
defendant and concluded that he exhibited signs of "alcohol abuse, adult
antisocial behavior, [and] schizotypal personality disorder with paranoid
features." Diagnostic Report, at 2-3. Despite these diagnoses, the prison staff
believed that defendant was fully accountable for his actions and that his primary
problem was his inability to take responsibility for his conduct. IsL
Both the presentence report and the diagnostic evaluation strongly
recommended prison, agreeing unanimously that defendant was an "unacceptable
candidate for rehabilitation or treatment services. IsL at 4. As the report stated
in its opening paragraph: "Mr. Criddle has shown through his past behavior that
he is unwilling to act responsibly while on probation and we feel it is now time
that he be held accountable for his behavior." LL at 2. The staff was struck by
defendant's "impulsive, self-indulgent, egocentric, immature, and irritable"
14

character, which, coupled with "significant criminal thinking errors" and his past
criminal history, left "no alternative" but prison commitment.6 I$L Defendant
refused to accept responsibility for his crime, persistently saying that the
conviction was a mistake and that "society" was at fault. IsL His refusal to
accept responsibility led to his unwillingness to participate in an assessment group
during his evaluation and counseling for alcohol and drug abuse. Presentence
Report at 9. Not seeming to understand the significance of the evaluation
process, he told the diagnostic staff "I would like to go home now since prison is
not really fun and I have been an unbelievably good sport about this whole
thing." Diagnostic Report, at 3. He also was given a disciplinary write-up for
destroying state property. LL
By the age of 25, when this evaluation occurred, defendant had been
arrested 18 times, convicted seven times, placed on probation for armed robbery
as a juvenile, and had another probation revoked because he "failed to report to
[the] probation office on several occasions [leading him to be] considered a

6

If the trial court did not know already, it learned through the presentence
report, that defendant stole another trailer the day before the incident which is the subject of
this appeal. He was convicted of this crime on April 18, 1995 and Judge Anne Stirba
sentenced him to a one-to-fifteen year prison term. Undoubtedly, this knowledge had a
significant impact on Judge Brian's sentencing decision. Judgment, Sentence (Commitment),
Case No. 951900292, Third District Court. That case is before the Court on a separate
appeal, Case No. 950687-CA.

15

maximum misdemeanor case." Presentence Report, at 9. Even though he was in
good health, before the crime defendant did not have a steady job, relying on his
parents to pay his $600 a month rent and groceries. LL He drank excessively
though he refused to admit his addiction. IoL. at 13, 14 (refusing to accept
counseling and failing to show up at AA meetings). At one point he
congratulated himself for "cutfting] down" on his consumption to the point of
having only "about one-half gallon" of alcohol every two weeks. IiL
Continuing his pattern of making vague threats, defendant persistently
made comments to his agent and diagnostic evaluator such as the following:
"You're not helping you're hurting I promise it will have an adverse affect. ...
Absolutely no good is going to come of it. The price will be high. The bill will
be paid." Diagnostic Report at 4.

Because of his continuing refusal to accept

responsibility, his prior criminal behavior, and conduct during the evaluation, the
staff believed he posed a "high risk to re-offend" and that prison was the only
option: "Perhaps Mr. Criddle will benefit if he is incarcerated for a period of
time prior to having the opportunity to participate in additional treatment." LL

16

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant challenges his conviction because he believes the trial judge was
impermissibly biased and hostile against him and that he was incompetent both to
proceed to trial and to sentencing. Realizing that neither of these issues were
preserved for the trial court, defendant argues primarily that he is entitled to
reversal under a plain error analysis; secondarily, defendant also claims his trial
counsel was ineffective.
Neither defendant's conviction nor sentence need be reversed under either
of these doctrines. The trial judge was not actually biased. Before the trial,
defendant sent a letter to the judge apologizing for his shooting gesture, which the
trial court accepted as heartfelt. Defendant provides no evidence that anything
occurred between then and the trial, or during the trial itself, that suggests any
bias. Regarding the post-trial suggestion of bias, defendant claims the judge was
biased as a result of the letters defendant sent to the judge beginning on July 28,
1995. Though these letters contain vague threats, they too do not require
disqualification. Essentially, what defendant argues for here is that anytime a
defendant threatens a judge, that judge must recuse himself. As a matter of
policy, such a stance would send precisely the wrong message and encourage a
plethora of threatening and intimidating letters to judges. The judge properly
17

sent copies of letters to the Board of Pardons and Parole, a sister agency to the
courts that has an invaluable role in the criminal justice system. The law
affirmatively requires judges to make recommendations to the board. The mere
addition of the judge's statement that he is "somewhat fearful of this man" does
not evidence bias, but merely the result of the judge's months-long observation of
defendant's character and propensity toward violence.
Defendant also does not establish that sufficient indicia of incompetency
occurred that should have led either the trial court or a reasonably prudent
attorney to question his competency. Both the trial judge and trial counsel were
concerned about defendant's mental health status and, pursuant to that concern,
had conducted two separate investigations into mental health, one before trial and
the jail's mental health unit and one at the prison's 90-day diagnostic center.
Nothing in either of those reports raised a red flag. The first evaluation indicated
no sign of mental illness. The prison evaluation diagnosed defendant with
schizotypal personality disorder but never raised the specter of competency.
Indeed, nothing in that thorough report suggests an actual inability to comprehend
proceedings or assist his counsel. Therefore, neither the trial court nor counsel
erred by not requesting a competency evaluation.

18

ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT THE
TRIAL JUDGE WAS ACTUALLY BIASED;
THEREFORE, THE COURT'S DECISIONS ARE
NOT REVERSIBLE ON THE GROUNDS THAT
THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED
HIMSELF.
Defendant challenges his conviction in part on the grounds that the

trial judge should have disqualified himself due to purported hostility or bias.
Defendant bases his claim on the judge's comments during the bench warrant
hearing of February 3, 1995 and the August 11 sentencing hearing, and the
judge's forwarding copies of his letters to the Board of Pardons and Parole with
the comment that he is "somewhat fearful of this man" (R. 217). Defendant also
asserts the trial judge should have recused himself because of threats he made
upon the judge's life. Brief of Defendant at 16.
Defendant never filed a motion for disqualification under rule 29, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, he must now show mat the trial judge's
refusal to unilaterally recuse himself was plain error, i.e., an obvious error that
affected the substantial rights of the accused.7 State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393,
7

To the extent defendant also makes an ineffective assistance claim, the analysis
follows along a similar path. Defendant must show that his trial counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced
the result. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); State v. Perry. 899 P.2d
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403 (Utah 1994), cert, denied 115 S.Ct. 910 (1995). The threshold step is
simply whether the trial judge was actually biased as a result of the defendant's
veiled threats.
Defendant's assertions of judicial bias have to be separated into two time
frames, i.e., pre-trial and post-trial, because the bases for the assertions
substantively differ and are separated by a trial devoid of any indication of bias.
As explained in the statement of facts, defendant chose not to appear in court for
a pre-trial conference in July 1994 and avoided arrest on the resulting bench
warrant for eight months. During the bail hearing in February 1995 after his
arrest, the judge was terse and clearly indicated his intent not to allow bail.
During the hearing, defendant made a gesture that simulated shooting the judge.
Having been notified of this incident by an AP&P officer who was in the
courtroom, Judge Brian had him re-arrested following his release due to the jail
consent decree. In early March 1995, the defendant wrote a letter to the judge
1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995). As this Court stated in State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 175
(Utah App. 1992), ineffective assistance and plain error share a "common standard,'' i.e., the
prejudice component. They also share another standard in common: in plain error analysis,
whether the error was obvious such that the judge should not have made it; in ineffective
assistance analysis, whether there were events (errors) that would have led the reasonably
prudent attorney to take a different course of action. Here, the State's main argument under a
plain error analysis is that there were no indicia of bias that would have led the trial court or
trial counsel to seek recusal. Thus, both concepts of plain error and ineffective assistance
proceed similarly and reach the same conclusion. Because defendant's brief appears to
concentrate on plain error, the State will also focus on that doctrine.
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apologizing for his conduct. At the March 10 hearing, the judge said he had
received the letter, believed it was heartfelt, and stated the matter was resolved.
The trial transcript shows that the judge was passive during the trial.
Except for ruling on one objection, he made no comments during presentation of
the evidence, opening statement, or closing argument. Defendant does not claim
that the trial judge's trial conduct was inappropriate. If defendant is asserting
that the trial was skewed because of defendant's gestures, the record reveals a
striking lack of evidence for this claim, given the written apology and the judge's
comment that he "did not dispute" that it was heartfelt (R. 246). As regards the
pre-trial part of this proceeding, defendant provides no evidence even of a
colorable claim of bias.
Though the post-trial episode technically began with the end of the trial,
the letters that constitute the basis for this claim of actual bias started on July 28,
1995, when defendant's first letter reached the judge (R. 174).8 At most, the
letters are vague assertions not of physical threats but that the judge will "suffer"
for having permitted conviction. To date, no Utah case has dealt with a potential
for judicial bias where a defendant has made threats, however vague, to a judge.
8

It is important to note here that once the jury convicted defendant of the charged
crime, the trial court was restricted to sentencing defendant to either probation or a one-tofifteen year prison term for the second-degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1995).
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In two similar cases from Colorado and Indiana, however, the state supreme
courts ruled that a defendant's threats against a judge did not require
disqualification. In Smith v. District Court for Fourth Jud. District. 629 P.2d
1055, 1059 (Colo. 1981), the court ruled that the trial judge's statement that he
believed the defendant would carry out his threats to shoot him did not mandate
recusal. The supreme court noted that the trial already had occurred and only
sentenced remained, precisely the same stage present here. The court said: "The
judge's comments did not show prejudice against the defendant, but rather
evidenced his interpretation of the defendant's propensity for violence based upon
information learned in the course of judicial proceedings. The defendant's
propensity for violence is a factor which the judge was entitled to consider in
imposing sentence. Smith, 629 P.2d at 1059. As the Colorado court explained,
good policy reasons also support a determination not to require recusal on the
basis of a defendant's threats: "[t]o allow threats toward a judge to cause
compulsory recusal would enable a defendant to use vulgarity and threats to
disqualify every judge that did not measure up to his own particular specifications
or requirements. Smith. 629 P.2d at 1059.
Regarding defendant's claim that the judge's comments at the sentencing
hearings revealed bias, the Indiana Supreme Court has ruled in an analogous case
22

that a trial judge's published comments that he was "mad" and "concerned"
about a defendant's threats did not establish "such prejudice ... as to deprive him
of the right to be tried before an impartial judge." Yager v. State. 437 N.E.2d
454, 462 (In. 1982). In so ruling, the court expressed an observation about the
trial judge's comments that is equally applicable here: "At best the remarks
attributed to the judge reflect thefrustrationshe must have felt in dealing with an
extremely uncooperative defendant who had made thinly veiled threats against the
judge and other ... officials." LL
Judge Brian's concern about defendant's mental health also conflicts with
the claim of judicial bias. An actually biased judge would be uninterested in any
potential for mitigation. Yet, the trial judge consistently gave trial counsel the
opportunity to investigate whatever was needed for mental health investigation.
Both the judge and defendant's counsel agreed defendant should have a mental
evaluation before sentencing and, for the purpose of obtaining more information,
the judge ordered a 90-day diagnostic evaluation (R. 400-01). The judge also
gave defendant and his trial counsel ample opportunity to review and challenge
the resulting evaluation and pre-sentence report, moving the sentencing date from
August 11 to September 1, 1995 (R. 387).
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Contrary to defendant's implicit challenge that the trial court was so biased
it refused to look at all the evidence, the record shows that the trial judge did
precisely what he said at sentencing: "The Court has reviewed the presentence
report. ...the diagnostic evaluation ... correspondence from the defendant. ...
argument from counsel [and] statements from the defendant" (R. 387). The trial
judge acted not on hostility or bias, but on the evidence before him, which
showed a 25-year old "impulsive, self-indulgent, egocentric, immature, and
irritable" "unacceptable candidate for rehabilitation or treatment services."
Diagnostic Report, at 2-3.
Faced with this information, the trial court had no real choice but prison.
As best evidenced by Judge Stirba's prison sentence for defendant's first trailer
theft, no reasonable judge could have granted probation to a 25-year old thief
who had been arrested 18 times, convicted seven times, placed on juvenile
probation for armed robbery, had another probation revoked, and who
consistently refused to accept responsibility for practically every crime he had
ever committed.9 Also, the trial court was entitled to use its knowledge of
defendant's character in its sentencing determination. Smith, 629 P.2d at 1059.

These occurrences are documented in the Statement of Facts.
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Through his persistent failure to show up for court or agency appointments and
vague threats of retribution, defendant told the court in no uncertain terms what
type of person he was. As the Colorado Supreme Court said in Smith, "any
opinions formed for or against a party from evidence or conduct occurring before
a judge in a judicial proceeding, and the judge's expressions of an opinion do not
constitute 'prejudice.'" LL
The trial court's sending copies of defendant's letters to the Board of
Pardons and Parole also did not evidence a wrongful bias or hostility. The parole
board is an integral part of the State's criminal justice system, of which the courts
are also an essential unit. Both law and common sense dictate that courts give
the board whatever information is pertinent to a criminal's sentence. Utah Code
Ann. 77-27-13(5) (1995) (court to provide recommendation to board).
Defendant's letters show relevant aspects of his character that the board, to fulfill
its role in the criminal justice system, needs to have.
The sentence was the result of defendant's criminal past, refusal to accept
responsibility, and blatant unwillingness to change, not judicial bias. The judge
based his decision on legitimate and wide-ranging sources of information. It is
no evidence of judicial bias that the only reasonable disposition on that evidence
was prison.
25

For the same reasons, defendant's interrelated claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must be rejected. Because defendant cannot show actual
bias, he cannot show ineffective assistance for two reasons: (1) the reasonably
prudent attorney would have seen, as trial counsel did, that no bias was present;
and (2) the motion for disqualification would have been denied. It is not
ineffective assistance for an attorney to refuse to bring a non-meritorious motion.
Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983).
H.

BECAUSE DEFENDANT EXHIBITED NO SIGNS
OF INCOMPETENCY DURING TRIAL, A
COMPETENCY HEARING WAS NOT
MANDATED.

Defendant now claims he should be given a new trial because he was
incompetent to proceed under Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (1995). As with
defendant's first issue regarding judicial bias, because defendant's competency
was not raised at trial, he must show plain error or ineffective assistance of
counsel. Defendant's analysis concentrates on the former, essentially arguing
that the trial court should have realized he was incompetent and ordered a hearing
sua sponte. His ineffective assistance claim is secondary but based on the same
basis, i.e., that defendant's letters should have raised a "red flag" of
incompetency that would have led the reasonably prudent attorney to initiate
26

competency proceedings. Both claims are without merit for the same reason:
though the letters evidence increasing bellicosity on defendant's part, they do not
exhibit indicia of incompetence that would have led either the reasonably prudent
trial counsel or trial judge to question competency.
Concededly, defendant never appeared to understand the prerogatives of,
or respect due, the trial court. However, this failure to understand does not mean
defendant lacked "a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against
him or of the [potential] punishment'' or the ability "to consult with his counsel
and to participate in the proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding." LL As defendant's brief shows, only one episode even
suggested any emotional problem before trial, i.e., the gestures defendant made
of shooting the judge. Brief of Defendant at 21. Any concerns this event raised
though were reasonably alleviated when staff for the Valley Mental Health-Salt
Lake County Jail Unit reported afterward on February 21, 1995, that defendant
had no "mental health problems" (R. 38).
Contrary to defendant's claims, this evaluation shows that trial counsel was
sensitive to the potential for mental health problems and was actively
investigating it. Nothing in the record gives any reason why any reasonably
prudent attorney would have petitioned for an inquiry into competency after
27

receiving this evaluation. The trial was held one month later and defendant
points to no incident during that month that would have changed a reasonably
prudent attorney's judgment. £££ Perry. 899 P.2d at 1239 (counsel's
performance adequate if it falls "within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance."). The trial transcript provides no backing for defendant's claim that
his conduct during trial was "extremely bizarre." Brief of Defendant at 21.
Defendant made no statements to the court nor did he testify. The record gives
no indication that defendant did anything, bizarre or not, during the trial. With
this paucity of evidence, no attorney could reasonably have contemplated
petitioning for an inquiry into competency.
Compared to Pate v. Robinson. 383 U.S. 375 (1966), the first United
States Supreme Court case to hold that a trial must be reversed because of the
trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing, the evidence of defendant's
incompetency is slight indeed. In Pate, the defense had four expert witnesses to
testify that the defendant was insane along with testimony from his mother about
his consistently erratic and irrational behavior. Additionally, a police officer
testified to defendant's behavior during and after arrest. Together, this evidence
mandated that the trial court inquire into defendant's competency to proceed.
Pate. 383 U.S. at 385. The evidence here is closer to that in State v. Young. 780
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P.2d 1233 (Utah 1989), which defendant claims supports her claim that counsel
should have petitioned for a competency hearing.
Ironically though, the Utah Supreme Court declared that Young was not
entitled to a competency hearing. In ruling that the evidence of incompetence
was insufficient to warrant an inquiry, the supreme court noted that Young had a
drug and alcohol addiction, that he suffered from slight to moderate depressions,
and that on one day of the trial he exhibited "some emotional distress." Young.
780 P.2d at 1236-37. Even together, these signs did not raise a reasonable doubt
of Young's competency. Young, at 1238. The Young court cited with approval
a New York case in which the appellate court ruled that defendant's rather
extreme behavior did not require a competency hearing. In People v. Harris. 491
N.Y.S. 2d 678, 684-86, the court "found numerous instances of emotional
courtroom outbursts, including instances where the defendant wept and a recess
was called because it was not clear whether the defendant 'was going to break
down.'" Nevertheless, the court refused to order a competency hearing. Young.
780 P.2d at 1238.
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Defendant also argues that his post-trial letters and comments should have
raised doubts about his competency to proceed to sentencing.10 In fact,
defendant's letters did become more bellicose as his sentencing date came
closer.11 However, trial counsel was, again, sensitive to the possibility of mental
illness and took reasonable actions to again investigate defendant's mental status.
At one pre-sentencing hearing, trial counsel and the court concurred in the
opinion that defendant needed a mental evaluation (R. 400-01). Prison staff
conducted this evaluation as part of the 90-day diagnostic and a psychologist
concluded that defendant had "alcohol abuse, adult antisocial behavior, [and]
schizotypal personality disorder with paranoid features." Diagnostic Report, at 23.
Defendant presents no evidence that, faced with such a diagnosis, a
question of his competence should have been obvious to the trial court or a
reasonably prudent attorney. The letters defendant now says evidence his
10

Apparently, defendant's argument is that, even if he was competent to stand
trial, he was not competent to be sentenced and, therefore, trial counsel should have petitioned
for incompetency at this pre-sentencing stage.
11

Defendant assumes that this increasing verbal bellicosity is the result of a
mental disease or defect. Surely another interpretation is that the defendantfinallyrealized
that he was now going to "be held accountable for his behavior." Diagnostic Report at 2. To
most people, the prospect of going to prison would frighten; to a person who believes in his
innocence, as defendant did, it would be a Kafkaesque nightmare. Thus defendant's behavior
is not necessarily evidence of irrationality so much as fear and consternation.
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incompetence are not incoherent. They straightforwardly present defendant's
view of the crime, his protestations of innocence, and his belief that, because the
judge did a bad thing by putting him in prison, bad things will, therefore, happen
to the judge. None of these letters indicate an "inability to have a rational and
factual understanding" of the proceedings and potential punishment or an inability
to consult with counsel and participate in the proceedings. Defendant's
participation in the sentencing hearing belies this notion (R. 385).
The record establishes that defendant's trial counsel made two separate
investigations into defendant's mental health status. Before trial, after the
shooting incident, Valley Mental Health determined defendant had no mental
health problems. After trial and only a few months before sentencing, prison
staff evaluated defendant, and, while finding that defendant had a schizotypal
personality disorder, never questioned competency. Defendant confuses the
presence of a mental illness with incompetency, a description of a functional
limitation on a person's mental abilities that results from a mental disorder or
retardation.12 Given this paucity of evidence, there was no "red flag" that would
n

"[A] person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental disorder
or mental retardation resulting either in: (1) his inability to have a rational and factual
understanding of the proceedings against him or the punishment specified for the offense
charged; or (2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the proceedings
against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2
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have made incompetency obvious to anyone. Therefore, because there were no
signs of incompetency that would have led the reasonably prudent trial judge or
counsel to order a hearing, there was neither plain error nor ineffective assistance
of counsel.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLICATION REQUESTED
Because of the paucity of Utah case law on judicial bias and the minimal
indicia of incompetency that should trigger a petition or order for a competency
hearing, the State requests oral argument and encourages publication.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS J^jlday of May 1996.

JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General

(1995).
For the purposes of criminal law, a "mental illness" "means a mental disease or defect
that substantially impairs a person's mental, emotional, or behavioral functioning. A mental
defect may be a congenital condition, the result of injury, or a residual effect of a physical or
mental disease and includes, but is not limited to, mental retardation." Utah Code Ann. § 762-305(4) (1995). Significantly for this case, "[mjental illness does not mean a personality or
character disorder or abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal conduct." IsL.
The Human Services Code contains a definition of mental illness that appears broader
that section 76-2-305. Under Utah Code Ann. § 62a-12-202(8) (Supp. 1995), a mental illness
means a "psychiatric disorder as defined by the current edition of Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders ... which substantially impairs a person's mental, emotional,
behavioral, or related functioning."
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